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Legal Ethics
by Patrick Emery Longan*

I.

INTRODUCTION

This Article covers the period from June 1, 2012 through May 31,
2013.' During this period, the Georgia Supreme Court decided a
number of lawyer-discipline cases and other matters related to licensure.
The supreme court and the Georgia Court of Appeals decided cases
involving legal malpractice, ineffective assistance of counsel, judicial
ethics, and several miscellaneous matters. The supreme court also
approved one significant Formal Advisory Opinion and one set of
changes to the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct.

* William Augustus Bootle Chair in Ethics and Professionalism in the Practice of Law,
Walter F. George School of Law, Mercer University. Washington University (B.A., 1979);
University of Sussex (M.A., 1980); University of Chicago (J.D., 1983).
1. For an analysis of Georgia legal ethics law during the prior survey period, see
Patrick Emery Longan, Legal Ethics, Annual Survey of Georgia Law, 64 MERCER L. REV.
189 (2012).
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LAWYER DISCIPLINE 2

A. Disbarments'
1. Trust Account Abuse or Other Financial Transgressions. Seven lawyers were disbarred or voluntarily surrendered their
licenses during the survey period primarily or exclusively because of
trust account abuse or other financial wrongdoing. Gregory E. Stuhler
commingled client and personal funds, withdrew trust account funds for
personal use, did not deliver client funds, kept insufficient records, and
overdrew his trust account.' Romin Vincent Alavi received a check for
$20,000 for a client, but, instead of depositing the money into his trust
account and delivering it to the client, Alavi told his client that the
funds had not been received.' Joseph N. Harden received $180,000 on
behalf of his two clients but never delivered the funds or accounted for
them.6 Michael Ditano worked as in-house counsel for a corporation but
had his employer's permission to represent other clients. Ditano had the
corporation's outside counsel do work for his private clients but then
billed their fees to the corporation. He voluntarily surrendered his law
license.' Lisa M. Cummings submitted false invoices as a contract
attorney for the Atlanta Office of the Public Defender and compounded
her difficulties by making false allegations against public officials and
lying to the client about the status of a matter.' Wendel Lawrence
Bowie failed to disburse or account for $300,000 in a refinancing

2. In addition to the matters recited in the text, the Investigative Panel of the Georgia
State Disciplinary Board imposed confidential discipline in dozens of cases. See Larry I.
Smith, Annual Report of the InvestigatingPanel State DisciplinaryBoardfor Operational
Year 2012-2013, STATE BAR OF GEORGIA 2013 REPORT OF THE OFFICE OF GENERAL
COUNSEL, at 5, available at http:H/www.gabar.org/barrules/ethicsandprofessionalism/uplo
ad/2012-13_OGC_AnnualReport.pdf.
3. Lawyers in Georgia can voluntarily surrender their licenses or submit a petition for
voluntary discipline. GA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4-110(f) (2012). The acceptance
of a voluntary surrender of a license or the granting of a petition for voluntary discipline
of disbarment are tantamount to disbarment by the court and are treated as such in this
Article. Id.
4. In re Stuhler, 291 Ga. 660, 661, 732 S.E.2d 84, 84 (2012).
5. In re Alavi, 291 Ga. 663, 663-64, 732 S.E.2d 86, 87 (2012).
6. In re Harden, 291 Ga. 357, 357, 729 S.E.2d 369, 369 (2012).
7. In re Ditano, 293 Ga. 79, 79, 743 S.E.2d 427, 427-28 (2013).
8. In re Cummings, 291 Ga. 654, 654-56, 732 S.E.2d 755, 755-56 (2012). Earlier during
the survey period, Cummings had been suspended for eighteen months for abandoning a
client's matter and submitting false information during that disciplinary process. In re
Cummings, 291 Ga. 310, 310, 728 S.E.2d 688, 689 (2012).
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transaction, failed to disburse or account for funds in connection with an
unrelated settlement, and failed to record deeds for another client.'
Thomas W. Dickson voluntarily surrendered his license after he
repeatedly ordered the accounting department at his firm to transfer
money from the firm's trust account to his personal account without
authorization of the firm or the clients.'o
2. Client Abandonment. A number of Georgia lawyers lost their
licenses during the survey period for abandoning clients, although some
of these lawyers committed other types of misconduct as well. Dana
Posey Gentry was disbarred because of his conduct in three divorce
matters, including failing to communicate with his clients, not filing
appropriate documents, failing to appear in court, and withdrawing
without notice." William M. Peterson voluntarily surrendered his
license, which had been suspended for three years for other transgressions, because he had willfully abandoned two clients." Steven Hyman
Hurwitz also relinquished his license after he accepted payment from
two clients, did no work for them, ceased communicating with them, and
refused to return their payments.a Adrienne Regina McFall agreed to
represent a client in an Ohio divorce case, despite her lack of an Ohio
license, and then did no work, refused to communicate with the client,
and failed to return the fee.' 4 McFall had already been suspended for
abandoning another client and was disbarred for her pattern of
abandonment and for practicing in Ohio without a license.'" Joseph
Seth Shaw abandoned one client and was disbarred, and the court noted
that Shaw had been previously disciplined three times.e Benjamin
Christopher Free abandoned five clients and lied in his responses to the
Notices of Investigation." In light of these facts and his disciplinary
history, Free was disbarred." Charles W. Field voluntarily surrendered his license after he failed to perform work on guardianship and
child support matters for one client. Field also did not advise the client
that she needed court permission to pay his fees from the client's
daughter's estate, and that failure led to a judgment against the client

9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.

In re Bowie, 291 Ga. 653, 653, 732 S.E.2d 759, 760 (2012).
In re Dickson, 292 Ga. 707, 707, 740 S.E.2d 622, 622 (2013).
In re Gentry, 291 Ga. 770, 770-71, 733 S.E.2d 330, 330-31 (2012).
In re Peterson, 291 Ga. 358, 358, 729 S.E.2d 369, 370 (2012).
In re Hurwitz, 291 Ga. 258, 258, 728 S.E.2d 660, 660 (2012).
In re McFall, 291 Ga. 312, 312, 728 S.E.2d 690, 690 (2012).
Id.
In re Shaw, 292 Ga. 149, 150, 734 S.E.2d 405, 406 (2012).
In re Free, 292 Ga. 339, 339, 737 S.E.2d 690, 690 (2013).
Id.
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for the amount of the fees. Field asked to relinquish his license and
noted that he had suffered severe personal problems and medical issues,
including hospitalizations and cancer."
Scott Patrick Archer was
disbarred after he abandoned one client who had paid him to file a
motion for a new trial in a criminal case and abandoned another for
whom he was supposed to be pursuing two collection matters.20 John
R. Wall was disbarred because he abandoned clients in three divorce
actions.2
In each, Wall accepted payment but ultimately stopped
communicating with his clients.2 2
3. Felony Convictions. Seven Georgia lawyers lost their licenses
during the survey period because of felony convictions. Arthur L. Gibson
Jr. was disbarred after he was convicted in federal court of dealing in
counterfeit obligations or securities." Wayne Andrew Williams pled
guilty to twenty-one counts of theft by taking and nineteen counts of
forgery, and he voluntarily surrendered his license to practice law. 4
Marcus L. Vickers was convicted of conspiracy to defraud the United
States and two counts of mail and wire fraud, all as a result of his
participation in the closings of two condominium sales." The supreme
court acknowledged that there were mitigating factors in Mr. Vickers's
case but ultimately disbarred him, noting that he was relatively
experienced in the practice of law, that he acted for a dishonest motive,
and that he facilitated mortgage fraud." Zondra Taylor Hutto was
disbarred as a result of her plea of guilty in federal court to one count
of withholding information of a crime.2 7 Charles Bailey Mullins II
suffered the same fate after he pled guilty to tax evasion in federal court
in West Virginia. 28 Robert E. Maloney Jr. voluntarily surrendered his
license after his conviction for bank fraud,29 while Lynn McNeese
Swank did the same after pleading guilty to perjury.ao

19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
(2012).
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.

In re Field, 292 Ga. 862, 862-63, 742 S.E.2d 477, 478-79 (2013).
In re Archer, 292 Ga. 553, 553-54, 739 S.E.2d 386, 386-87 (2013).
In re Wall, 292 Ga. 891, 891-92, 742 S.E.2d 726, 728 (2013).
Id. at 891-92, 742 S.E.2d at 727.
In re Gibson, 291 Ga. 660, 660, 732 S.E.2d 85, 85 (2012); see also 18 U.S.C. § 473
In re Williams, 291 Ga. 659, 659, 732 S.E.2d 85, 85-86 (2012).
In re Vickers, 291 Ga. 354, 354, 729 S.E.2d 355, 356 (2012).
Id. at 354-55, 729 S.E.2d at 356.
In re Hutto, 292 Ga. 556, 556, 739 S.E.2d 385, 385-86 (2013).
In re Mullins, 292 Ga. 644, 644-45, 740 S.E.2d 173, 173-74 (2013).
In re Maloney, 292 Ga. 900, 900, 742 S.E.2d 738, 738 (2013).
In re Swank, 292 Ga. 900, 900, 742 S.E.2d 739, 739 (2013).
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4. Reciprocal Disbarments. During the survey period, two Georgia
lawyers were disbarred as reciprocal discipline. John Lee Scott lost his
Florida license for reasons that the Georgia Supreme Court did not
identify."' David Alan Friedman was disbarred in Kentucky after he
failed to account for tens of thousands of dollars of client funds." The
Georgia Supreme Court disbarred them both in Georgia as a matter of
reciprocity.3
5. Miscellaneous Disbarments. Three lawyers lost their licenses
during the survey period for miscellaneous reasons. Patrick Jeffery
Stubbs was disbarred because he filed a civil case while he was
suspended from the practice of law.3" Kevin Eugene Hooks lost his
license because he committed that same infraction and numerous others,
including an improper response to a motion for summary judgment and
failures to respond to discovery, to communicate with clients, to inform
opposing counsel and courts of his suspension, and to use funds that he
received as a fiduciary as they were intended to be used." Marion
Jeanne Browning-Baker did not cooperate with discovery in her
disciplinary proceeding, which arose from her representation of a client
who sought a divorce. In the underlying matter, Ms. Browning-Baker
represented a husband against a former client of hers, despite a clear
conflict of interest, and was paid more than $12,000, although she filed
the case in an improper jurisdiction and was never able to complete the
divorce."
B.

Suspensions"

The supreme court suspended two lawyers for periods of less than six
months. The court accepted the petition of Richard R. Buckley Jr. for a
four-month suspension." Buckley stopped communicating with a client
and asserted a lien on the client's file for eighteen months after he was
fired.3 ' The court noted that he had been disciplined for similar
conduct three times before but also noted that he had been suffering

31. In re Scott, 291 Ga. 259, 259, 728 S.E.2d 661, 661 (2012).
32. In re Friedman, 292 Ga. 338, 338, 737 S.E.2d 689, 689 (2013).
33. Id.; In re Scott, 291 Ga. at 259, 728 S.E.2d at 661.
34. In re Stubbs, 291 Ga. 828, 828-29, 735 S.E.2d 281, 281 (2012).
35. In re Hooks, 292 Ga. 781, 781-84, 741 S.E.2d 645, 646-48 (2013).
36. In re Browning-Baker, 292 Ga. 809, 809-11, 741 S.E.2d 637, 637-38 (2013).
37. This Article discusses only those suspensions that constitute final discipline and
does not discuss interim suspensions.
38. In re Buckley, 291 Ga. 661, 661-62, 732 S.E.2d 87, 87-88 (2012).
39. Id. at 662, 732 S.E.2d at 87.
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from health problems that he was addressing through the Georgia
Lawyers' Assistance Program." Warner Russell Hodges received a
sixty-day suspension as reciprocal discipline because he had been
suspended in Tennessee for practicing while his Tennessee license was
inactive."
Five lawyers received six-month suspensions. Arjun S. Kapoor
obtained and served a fake subpoena on a crisis center in an effort to
obtain documents about someone who had made allegations of family
violence against him."' Tony C. Jones received an additional six-month
suspension, to be served consecutively with an existing eighteen-month
suspension, for his abandonment of two clients, which he explained in
part as resulting from "burnout or other mental health problems."
The court accepted his petition for voluntary discipline, including the
suspension and the condition that he could be reinstated only with
certification from a licensed psychologist or psychiatrist that he is fit to
practice." Paul Troy Wright was suspended for making false statements in a brief to the Georgia Court of Appeals, and the supreme court
noted that it was troubled by Wright's continued assertions during the
disciplinary proceedings that his statements had been true, an argument
that the supreme court described as "sophistry." Clark Jones-Lewis
did not remit $4000 that she had received on behalf of a client until the
client retained new counsel three years later, and she gave contradictory
explanations of the matter in the disciplinary process." Barbara Sims
Arthur received her six-month suspension as reciprocal discipline after
she was suspended for six months in Tennessee for failing to pay her
registration fees.
Two Georgia lawyers were suspended for periods between six and
eighteen months. Chima Earnest Okene overdrew his trust account
several times, commingled personal and client funds, and improperly
advanced money to clients." The supreme court accepted his petition
for voluntary discipline, noting in mitigation that Okene had suffered
from health problems and that no client funds were misappropriated or
lost." Eric C. Lang used client funds to pay his firm's bills in the

40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

Id. at 662, 732 S.E.2d at 87-88.
In re Hodges, 291 Ga. 830, 830, 733 S.E.2d 775, 776 (2012).
In re Kapoor, 293 Ga. 161, 161, 743 S.E.2d 426, 426 (2013).
In re Jones, 292 Ga. 310, 310, 736 S.E.2d 432, 432 (2013).
Id. at 310-11, 736 S.E.2d at 432-33.
In re Wright, 291 Ga. 841, 842-44, 732 S.E.2d 275, 276-78 (2012).
In re Jones-Lewis, 291 Ga. 651, 651-52, 732 S.E.2d 79, 80-81 (2012).
In re Arthur, 291 Ga. 658, 658, 732 S.E.2d 86, 86 (2012).
In re Okene, 291 Ga. 656, 656-57, 736 S.E.2d 748, 748 (2012).
Id.
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forlorn expectation that the firm would receive fees to cover the
misappropriation. When those fees did not arrive, Lang deceived
opposing counsel and his client for many months before finally admitting
what he did." The court suspended Lang for twelve months, noting
that he had made full restitution to his client and that he had been
treated for depression and for symptoms of bipolar disorder.5 '
Four lawyers were suspended for eighteen months. As noted earlier,
Lisa M. Cummings received an eighteen-month suspension during the
survey period and was later disbarred." Carol Chandler received that
same punishment for abandonment of one client in an immigration
matter." Chandler took the client's money but did not communicate
with him, file the necessary documents, or return the fee." Amjad
Muhammad Ibrahim was suspended as a result of two grievances
involving the commingling of client and firm funds." The court
accepted the petition for voluntary discipline of Christopher Todd Adams
and suspended him for eighteen months because he submitted seventeen
bills to the Gwinnett Judicial Circuit Indigent Defense Program for
hours he falsely claimed to have worked for indigent clients.
The supreme court ordered three suspensions of longer than eighteen
months. James H. Dickey had been suspended for two years in South
Carolina for three acts of misconduct: the creation of a false medical
record that he submitted as part of a settlement package, a willful
failure to comply with an arbitration award, and a failure to inform a
client that her medical malpractice claim had been dismissed." The
supreme court imposed the same suspension as reciprocal discipline.
Ashley A. Davis received a thirty-month suspension after her conviction
for unlawful possession of methamphetamine, for which she, as a first
offender, had been sentenced to three years of probation." The court
noted in mitigation that her offense had nothing to do with her clients
or law practice and came at a time of difficulties in her personal life.60

50. In re Lang, 292 Ga. 894, 894-95, 741 S.E.2d 152, 153 (2013).
51. Id. at 897, 741 S.E.2d at 154.
52. In re Cummings, 291 Ga. at 654, 656, 732 S.E.2d at 755, 757.
53. In re Chandler, 292 Ga. 555, 555, 739 S.E.2d 387, 388 (2013).
54. Id.
55. In re Ibrahim, 291 Ga. 774, 774, 733 S.E.2d 331, 331-32 (2012); see also In re
Ibrahim, 291 Ga. 94, 95, 727 S.E.2d 501, 502 (2012). One of the grievances also included
allegations of a lack of diligence. In re Ibrahim, 291 Ga. at 95, 727 S.E.2d at 502.
56. In re Adams, 291 Ga. 768, 768-69, 732 S.E.2d 446, 446-47 (2012).
57. In re Dickey, 292 Ga. 12, 12, 734 S.E.2d 18, 18 (2012).
58. Id. at 13-14, 734 S.E.2d at 19.
59. In re Davis, 292 Ga. 897, 897, 742 S.E.2d 734, 734 (2013).
60. Id. at 898, 742 S.E.2d at 734-35.
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The court imposed conditions on her reinstatement, including certifications from the Georgia State Bar Lawyer Assistance Program and a
licensed therapist, psychologist, or psychiatrist.e" The court accepted
the petition for voluntary discipline and suspended Kathryn J. Jaconetti
for three years because of her abandonment of eight clients.6 2 The
court noted in mitigation that Jaconetti had sought treatment for bipolar
disorder and conceded that she was not currently mentally competent to
practice law.6" The court imposed conditions on her reinstatement,
including restitution to clients and certifications of her mental fitness."

C. Reprimands
The supreme court ordered three public reprimands and one Review
Panel reprimand during the survey period. Kenneth A. Glenn successfully petitioned for such voluntary discipline as a result of neglect of one
client's matter, for which he had made restitution." The court also
accepted a petition for a voluntary public reprimand from Neal Henry
Howard, who admitted that he had deposited personal funds into his
Interest on Lawyers Trust Account (IOLTA) and overdrew that account
when a check was mistakenly deposited into the firm's operating
account." No clients were harmed, and Howard had changed his firm's
accounting practices to prevent any further violations." Jerry Wayne
Moncus received a public reprimand because he undertook to represent
three people seeking termination of probation that Moncus himself had
imposed as Chief Judge of the Municipal Court of Dalton.6 8 The
Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct forbid a lawyer from representing
"anyone in connection with a matter in which the lawyer participated
personally and substantially as a judge" without the consent of all
parties, which Moncus had not obtained.6 9 Finally, the court accepted
a voluntary petition seeking a Review Panel reprimand from Ted H.
Reed.o Reed, who had lost his license in 1979 for accepting a bribe as
a probation officer, had been reinstated in 1988, and had received a

61. Id. at 898, 742 S.E.2d at 735.
62. In re Jaconetti, 291 Ga. 772, 772-74, 732 S.E.2d 447, 448-49 (2012).
63. Id. at 772-73, 732 S.E.2d at 448.
,64. Id. at 773, 732 S.E.2d at 449.
65. In re Glenn, 292 Ga. 811, 811-12, 741 S.E.2d 651, 652 (2013). The Author served
as special master in this matter.
66. In re Howard, 292 Ga. 413, 413-14, 738 S.E.2d 89, 89 (2013).
67. Id. at 414, 738 S.E.2d at 89.
68. In re Moncus, 291 Ga. 767, 767-68, 733 S.E.2d 330, 330 (2012).
69. Id. at 767, 733 S.E.2d at 330 (quoting GA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.12(a)
(2012)).
70. In re Reed, 291 Ga. 257, 257-58, 731 S.E.2d 50, 50 (2012).
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formal letter of admonition in 2007. In the most recent matter, Reed
admitted that he had violated his duty of communication when he had
been unable to answer a client's questions about post-judgment
proceedings."
D.

Petitionsfor Voluntary Discipline Rejected
The supreme court rejected five petitions for voluntary discipline
during the survey period. In three of these cases, the State Bar of
Georgia either did not object or had agreed to the proposed punishment.
Reed Emondson Jr. sought a Review Panel reprimand as discipline for
his failure to communicate with a client and his failure to assist the
client upon withdrawal, but the court rejected that petition in light of his
prior disciplinary history. 2 The court rejected John Floyd Woodham's
petition seeking a Review Panel reprimand for having admittedly filed
two cases opposing bond validations and then offering not to pursue
them in exchange for a payment of over $1 million.73 Dale E. Calomeni
collected funds for a client but did not notify the client or place them in
his trust account. Calomeni also allowed a disbarred lawyer to work for
him and have direct contact with clients, and he filed and prosecuted a
suit for a client despite the client's instructions regarding the proper
parties." The State Bar agreed that a Review Panel reprimand would
be appropriate, but the court rejected the petition because of the number
of violations and because one of them involved mishandling client
funds.
The court rejected two petitions for voluntary discipline that had been
recommended by special masters. Ricardo L. Polk failed to appear at
hearings for two clients, did not communicate with them about their
matters, and did not withdraw from representing one client while he was
suspended." The court rejected his petition for a two-year suspension
in light of his prior disciplinary history and because of insufficient
evidence of the restitution he had paid to his former clients." The
court also rejected a Review Panel reprimand for Margrett A. Skinner,
who admitted that she had posted personal and confidential information

71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.

Id.
In re Edmondson, 291 Ga. 356, 356-57, 729 S.E.2d 368, 368-69 (2012).
In re Woodham, 291 Ga. 255, 255-57, 728 S.E.2d 659, 659-60 (2012).
In re Calomeni, 293 Ga. 76, 76, 743 S.E.2d 424, 425 (2013).
Id. at 77, 743 S.E.2d at 425-26.
In re Polk, 292 Ga. 147, 147, 149, 734 S.E.2d 391, 392-93 (2012).
Id. at 149, 734 S.E.2d at 393.
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about a former client on the internet in response to negative reviews of
Skinner, which the former client had posted on consumer web sites."

E. Reinstatements
The supreme court granted a certificate of fitness for readmission to
one disbarred lawyer and granted petitions for reinstatement to two
suspended lawyers during the survey period. D. John Skandalakis had
been disbarred in 2005 after he pled guilty in federal court to making
false statements about events that occurred while he held a public office
position.7 9 The court granted his certificate of fitness for readmission
in light of his letters of support and because he had "shown remorse and
... strived to act with integrity and responsibility through his hard
work, his devotion to his family, and as a volunteer in his community."80 Benjamin Lanier Bagwell was reinstated after he completed his
suspension and proved his mental fitness to practice by submitting
letters about his therapy, medications, symptoms, and current mental
health from a board-certified psychiatrist."' Similarly, Morris P. Fair
Jr. was reinstated after he submitted letters showing that he was
psychiatrically stable and fit to practice."
III.

LEGAL MALPRACTICE

The supreme court decided two important cases regarding legal
malpractice claims during the survey period, and the court of appeals
decided another, although its judgment in that case was vacated by the
supreme court soon after the survey period ended."
In Villanueva v. First American 7lle Insurance Co.," the supreme
court held that claims for attorney malpractice are not per se unassignable." When a lender's funds that were intended to pay off prior
mortgages were misappropriated after a closing, the title company made
the payoffs and then asserted claims of legal malpractice against the

78. In re Skinner, 292 Ga. 640, 640-42, 740 S.E.2d 171, 172-73 (2013).
79. In re Skandalakis, 292 Ga. 902, 902, 742 S.E.2d 736, 737 (2013).
80. Id. at 903, 742 S.E.2d at 737.
81. In re Bagwell, 292 Ga. 340, 340, 737 S.E.2d 690, 691 (2013).
82. In re Fair, 292 Ga. 308, 308-09, 736 S.E.2d 430, 430 (2013).
83. One other case deserves a brief mention. In Holland v. Cavaniss,292 Ga. 332, 737
S.E.2d 669 (2013), the supreme court held that evidence of an attorney's wealth could not
be introduced in a legal malpractice action brought under O.C.G.A. § 51-12-6 (2000), in
which the plaintiff seeks damages for injury to peace, happiness, or feelings but may not
be awarded punitive damages. Holland, 292 Ga. at 332, 737 S.E.2d at 669-70 (interpreting
O.C.G.A. § 51-12-6 (2000)).
84. 292 Ga. 630, 740 S.E.2d 108 (2013).
85. Id. at 630, 740 S.E.2d at 109.
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closing attorney under its subrogation rights." The supreme court
rejected arguments that, as matters of statutory interpretation and of
public policy, legal malpractice claims should not be assignable."
Section 44-12-24 of the Official Code of Georgia Annotated (O.C.G.A.)r
permits assignments of rights of action for property rights but not for
personal torts or fraud.89 The court distinguished claims of legal
malpractice, which arise in contract or tort and seek recovery of damages
for financial harm, from personal tort claims such as injury to property,
reputation, or feelings."o The court noted that a majority of states ban
the assignment of legal malpractice claims as a matter of public policy
but surveyed the states that have rejected that view and joined the
minority.9'
Leibel v. Johnson" involved the admissibility of expert testimony
regarding causation in a legal malpractice case. The plaintiff had the
burden to show that the attorney's negligence caused her harm, and to
do that she needed to show that, but for the attorney's negligence, she
would have won the case for which the attorney had been hired.9" Trial
of such a "suit within a suit" is common in legal malpractice actions, and
the question before the supreme court was whether the plaintiff should
have been permitted to offer expert testimony regarding the likely
outcome of the underlying case. 5 The court of appeals had held that
such evidence was admissible in cases in which a layperson could not
decide the issue of causation." The supreme court reversed, noting
that the jury's job in the malpractice action is not to decide what the
first jury would have done but only to decide what a reasonable jury
would have done. 7 The malpractice jury is just as capable of deciding
the underlying issues as the first jury would have been, and therefore
the court held that expert evidence on causation should not have been
admitted.98

86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.

Id. at 631, 740 S.E.2d at 109.
Id. at 635, 740 S.E.2d at 112.
O.C.G.A. § 44-23-24 (2002 & Supp. 2013).
Id.
Villanueva, 292 Ga. at 631-32, 740 S.E.2d at 110.
Id. at 633-35, 740 S.E.2d at 111-12.
291 Ga. 180, 728 S.E.2d 554 (2012).
Id. at 183, 728 S.E.2d at 556-57.
Id. at 182, 728 S.E.2d at 556.
Id. at 180, 182-83, 728 S.E.2d at 555-57.
Id. at 182, 728 S.E.2d at 556.
Id. at 183, 728 S.E.2d at 556-57.
Id. at 182-83, 728 S.E.2d at 556.
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During the survey period, the court of appeals decided a case involving
the applicability of the attorney-client privilege and the work-product
doctrine when it becomes apparent that a law firm's client may assert
claims against the firm and the firm consults with in-house counsel and
otherwise begins preparing to assess and defend the claim." Although
the court of appeals decided that resolving these issues involved inquiry
and analysis regarding the firm's conflicts of interest and whether any
conflicts should be imputed to in-house counsel, the supreme court
vacated that judgment soon after the survey period ended.'00 The
supreme court held that the rules of conduct are not relevant to issues
of attorney-client privilege or work-product immunity and that the usual
rules defining those doctrines should apply, even when the communications are with a law firm's in-house counsel about a potential claim by
an existing client, and even when documents are created in anticipation
of litigation with an existing client.'0 1
IV. INEFFECTiVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
A. Cases in Which Claims of Ineffective Assistance Ultimately
Prevailed
In State v. Crapp,o2 the court of appeals affirmed the Superior
Court of Dougherty County's grant of a new trial based upon a claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel.0o The alleged crimes were armed
robbery and kidnapping. The perpetrator of the crime forced the victim
to drive him to a house. The victim could not identify the assailant but
was able to retrace the route she had taken with the perpetrator and
identify the house he had entered. A man at that house, Lorenzo
Simpson, identified the defendant as someone who had come to the
house on the night of the crime to buy crack cocaine. The defendant
testified that Simpson identified him because the defendant owed
Simpson money and because the defendant had filed a police report that
led to an arrest warrant for, and the indictment of, one of Simpson's
associates. The defense counsel had a copy of the indictment but did not
introduce it, or the arrest warrant or police report, to buttress the
defendant's testimony. In closing arguments, the prosecutor sought to

99. Hunter, Maclean, Exley & Dunn, P.C. v. St. Simons Waterfront, LLC, 317 Ga.
App. 1, 1-3, 730 S.E.2d 608, 611-13 (2012), vacated, 293 Ga. 419, 746 S.E.2d 98 (2013).
100. St. Simons Waterfront, LLC v. Hunter, Maclean, Exley & Dunn, P.C., 293 Ga. 419,
419-20, 746 S.E.2d 98, 102 (2013).
101. Id. at 430, 746 S.E.2d at 109.
102. 317 Ga. App. 744, 732 S.E.2d 806 (2012).
103. Id. at 744, 732 S.E.2d at 807.
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cast doubt on the defendant's explanation of why Simpson would identify
him as having come to the house the night of the crime by reminding the
jury that no police report had been offered by the defense.'xo
The court of appeals held that the failure to introduce the documentation that corroborated the defendant's story was deficient performance,
because the state's case depended completely upon whether the jury
believed Simpson or the defendant.10 5 The court of appeals agreed
with the trial court that there was sufficient prejudice to the defendant
because the state's evidence was "thin" and affirmed the trial court's
grant of a new trial."o
In Owens v. State,' 7 the court of appeals reversed the Superior
Court of Gwinnett County's denial of a motion for a new trial based upon
The defendant was
a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.'
convicted on two counts of robbery by sudden snatching. The physical
evidence against the defendant was weak. It consisted only of similarities between shoes that the defendant owned and a print left at the
scene of a crime. The most important evidence that the prosecution
offered was testimony from a probation officer and a law enforcement
officer that the defendant was the person in a surveillance video of one
of the two crimes. The defense counsel did not object to this testimony
and conceded that there was no strategic reason for her failure to do
80.109

The court of appeals noted that the identification testimony from one
of the two witnesses was inadmissible, because opinion testimony is only
admissible if there is some reason to believe that the witness is better
able to make the identification than the jury, such as when the
appearance of the defendant has changed between the time of the crime
and trial."0 Here, there were no such circumstances."'l Thus, the
defense counsel's failure to object to the opinion testimony was deficient
Additionally, the defendant demonstrated harm
performance." 2
because the other evidence against him was so weak and he would likely
have been acquitted."'

104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.

Id. at 744-46, 732 S.E.2d at 807-09.
Id. at 748, 732 S.E.2d at 809.
Id. at 748, 732 S.E.2d at 810.
317 Ga. App. 821, 733 S.E.2d 16 (2012).
Id. at 821, 733 S.E.2d at 17.
Id. at 823-24, 733 S.E.2d at 18-19.
Id. at 824, 733 S.E.2d at 19.
Id. at 825, 733 S.E.2d at 19.
Id. at 826, 733 S.E.2d at 20.
Id.
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State v. Moore" was a rape case in which the defendant claimed
The prosecution elicited
that the intercourse was consensual."'
testimony that the defendant refused to talk to a detective about the
allegations before the defendant was arrested and declined to turn
himself in right away. The prosecutor used this evidence against the
defendant in closing argument. The defendant was convicted and sought
a new trial." Georgia law is clear that it is improper to comment on
The
a defendant's pre-arrest silence or failure to come forward."
defense counsel admitted that he was unaware of this, and the Superior
Court of Gwinnett County found the failure to object to be deficient
performance. The trial court found further that the prosecution had
intentionally elicited the improper testimony and commented upon it and
that the evidence against the defendant was not overwhelming.'s The
trial court ordered a new trial based upon ineffective assistance of
counsel, and the court of appeals affirmed."'
B.

Holdings of Ineffective Assistance Reversed
In seven cases, the supreme court reversed lower-court decisions that
granted relief because of ineffective assistance of counsel, while the court
of appeals reversed a trial court's grant of a new trial based upon
ineffective assistance in one case.
In Seabolt v. Hall,2 0 the Superior Court of Habersham County
granted habeas corpus relief to a woman who had been convicted of
murdering her husband. 21 The defendant's eight-year-old daughter
testified at trial that she heard the victim, her stepfather, tell the
defendant to "put the gun down." The daughter testified in the judge's
chambers, with only the parties' attorneys present. The testimony was
broadcast to the courtroom by closed circuit television, and the defendant's attorney did not object to this procedure. 2 2 The supreme court
reversed the trial court's decision because the defendant could not show
prejudice from the lawyer's failure to object to the in-chambers testimony
of her daughter.2 3 The defendant claimed that she could have assisted her attorney with his cross-examination of the daughter, but the
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.

318 Ga. App. 118, 733 S.E.2d 418 (2012).
Id. at 120, 733 S.E.2d at 420.
Id. at 120-22, 733 S.E.2d at 420-22.
Id. at 122, 733 S.E.2d at 422.
Id. at 121-22, 124, 733 S.E.2d at 421-24.
Id. at 118, 124, 733 S.E.2d at 419, 423.
292 Ga. 311, 737 S.E.2d 314 (2013).
Id. at 311, 737 S.E.2d at 315.
Id. at 311-12, 737 S.E.2d at 315-16.
Id. at 315, 737 S.E.2d at 317-18.
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supreme court noted that the lawyer was aware of all of the information
that the defendant would have provided had she been present.'2 4 The
trial court had applied a presumption-of-prejudice standard, but,
applying Strickland v. Washington,2 ' the supreme court held that the
defendant had to show harm.126 Although the defendant would have
been entitled to a presumption-of-prejudice standard if this particular
point had been raised on direct appeal, she had to show harm when it
was raised as part of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim in a
habeas petition. 127
Williams v. Kelleyl 28 involved a claim of ineffective assistance by
appellate counsel." The defendant had been convicted of two counts
of felony murder after the judge charged the jury on two methods of
committing that offense, despite the fact that the indictment only listed
one of those methods.3 o The supreme court acknowledged that it was
error for the Superior Court of Baldwin County to do so but nevertheless
reversed the grant of the defendant's habeas petition.'' The court
reasoned that appellate counsel was not ineffective for not raising the
point, because the error was cured when the trial judge gave the jury the
indictment.'
Therefore, any argument about the jury charge on
direct appeal would have failed.'
In Tompkins v. Hall,"' the supreme court reversed the grant of
habeas relief to a defendant who had been convicted in absentia of
possession of marijuana with the intent to distribute and trafficking in
cocaine.13
The habeas court had found that "the defense lawyers
merely winged it without any preparations. As a result there was no
meaningful adversarial testing of the charges brought against Hall."' 6
The supreme court reversed because the allegations of ineffective
assistance of trial counsel had not been raised in a timely manner, and
any claim about appellate counsel's effectiveness for not raising the
claims would have failed because the prisoner was a fugitive from justice

124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.

Id. at 315, 737 S.E.2d at 317.
466 U.S. 668 (1984).
Seabolt, 292 Ga. at 313, 737 S.E.2d at 316.
Id. at 313-14, 737 S.E.2d at 316-17.
291 Ga. 285, 728 S.E.2d 666 (2012).
Id. at 285, 728 S.E.2d at 667.
Id.
Id. at 287, 728 S.E.2d at 668.
Id. at 286-87, 728 S.E.2d at 668.
Id.
291 Ga. 224, 728 S.E.2d 621 (2012).
Id. at 224, 728 S.E.2d at 622.
Id. at 225, 728 S.E.2d at 623.
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and his appeal would have been dismissed, no matter what claims
appellate counsel had made.a 7
In Humphrey v. Lewis,'a the court reviewed the circumstances that
led to the conviction of Christopher Lewis for murder, burglary, and
related offenses for the fourth time."' This time, the habeas court had
vacated all of the convictions on various grounds.'40 The supreme
court reversed and reinstated the convictions."' The court held that
there was no harm from two alleged violations of the prosecutor's duty
to disclose exculpatory evidence. 2 It also held that appellate counsel
was not ineffective for failing to raise the Superior Court of Butts
County's refusal to charge on involuntary manslaughter, because the
evidence would not have supported such a charge, and that appellate
counsel was not ineffective for failing to raise several meritless claims
of prosecutorial misconduct on appeal from the convictions."
State v. Martinez'" involved a claim by a resident alien that his
lawyer had advised him erroneously not to be concerned about deportation if he pled guilty to aggravated battery."' In Padilla v. Kentucky,"" the United States Supreme Court held in 2010 that incorrect
advice about such a collateral consequence could constitute deficient
performance by counsel."' However, in Martinez, the trial judge had
specifically asked the defendant if he understood that he faced deportation if he pled guilty and asked him whether he wanted to continue with
the plea even after the judge expressed the understanding that at some
time in the future the federal government would take action to deport
him."' The Georgia Supreme Court held that, because of this colloquy, Martinez could not show that he had been prejudiced by his
lawyer's earlier advice.1' The court took pains to note, however, that
it would be possible to show prejudice despite a court's warnings if, for
example, the lawyer advised the client before or during a plea hearing

137. Id. at 227, 728 S.E.2d at 624.
138. 291 Ga. 202, 728 S.E.2d 603 (2012).
139. Id. at 202, 728 S.E.2d at 606. The earlier decisions are reported. Hall v. Lewis,
286 Ga. 767, 692 S.E.2d 580 (2010); Lewis v. State, 277 Ga. 534, 592 S.E.2d 405 (2004);
Lewis v. State, 275 Ga. 194, 565 S.E.2d 437 (2002).
140. Humphrey, 291 Ga. at 203, 728 S.E.2d at 606.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 204, 728 S.E.2d at 607.
143. Id. at 216, 728 S.E.2d at 615.
144. 291 Ga. 455, 729 S.E.2d 390 (2012).
145. Id. at 455, 729 S.E.2d at 391.
146. 559 U.S. 356 (2010).
147. Id. at 359-60.
148. 291 Ga. at 456, 728 S.E.2d at 392.
149. Id. at 457, 728 S.E.2d at 393.
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to disregard any warnings given by the court.o50 Because there was no
evidence of such advice in Martinez, however, the court reversed the
grant of habeas relief.'
State v. Sosa' 52 also involved the holding in Padilla.'s The habeas
court granted relief because Sosa pled guilty to child molestation in 2002
without the benefit of advice that the plea would subject him to
deportation. Sosa was in fact deported in 2010.1" The supreme court
overturned the habeas court because they concluded that the petition
was barred by Georgia's four-year statute of limitations."' The court
noted that Sosa could only circumvent the limitations defense if he could
show that the right he asserted based on the 2010 decision in Padilla
was "newly recognized" and was made "retroactively applicable" to cases
on collateral review.'56 The supreme court held that Sosa's claim
should have been dismissed,"' and the court's conclusion was validated when the United States Supreme Court later held that the rule in
Padilla should not be applied retroactively to habeas cases."
In Humphrey v. Riley,"' the Georgia Supreme Court reversed the
habeas court, reinstated both of the defendant's murder and arson
convictions, as well as the death sentence.'6 0 The lower court had
found multiple instances of ineffective assistance of counsel, but the
supreme court held as to each that either the trial counsel was not
deficient or, even if he was, the deficiencies did not prejudice the
defendant because of "the overwhelming evidence of Riley's guilt,
including the evidence of his prior contemplation of arson and murder,
the evidence of his motive, and his pre-trial admission that he intentionally set the fire."'
In State v. Wofford,' 62 the court of appeals reversed the Superior
Court of Gwinnett County's grant of a new trial based upon ineffective
assistance of counsel."6 s The defendant had been convicted of aggra-

150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.

Id. at 457, 728 S.E.2d at 392.
Id. at 457-58, 728 S.E.2d at 392-93.
291 Ga. 734, 733 S.E.2d 262 (2012).
Id. at 736, 733 S.E.2d at 264.
Id. at 735, 733 S.E.2d at 263.
Id. at 738-39, 733 S.E.2d at 265; see also O.C.G.A. § 9-14-42(c) (2006).
O.C.G.A. § 9-14-42(c)(3); Sosa, 291 Ga. at 738, 733 S.E.2d at 265.
Sosa, 291 Ga. at 735, 733 S.E.2d at 263.
Chaidez v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 1103, 1105 (2013).
291 Ga. 534, 731 S.E.2d 740 (2012).
Id. at 534-35, 731 S.E.2d at 742.
Id. at 544-45, 731 S.E.2d at 749.
321 Ga. App. 249, 739 S.E.2d 110 (2013).
Id. at 256, 739 S.E.2d at 115.
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vated child molestation and child molestation for acts he allegedly
committed on his girlfriend's two daughters, who were the primary
witnesses against him. The trial court granted the new trial because
trial counsel had failed to locate and present as witnesses two teachers
who would have testified that, at the time of the alleged crimes, the
daughters did not have good reputations for truthfulness. Trial counsel
had testified that he did not call the teachers because he did not know
about them, but there was no finding from the trial court that the
lawyer reasonably should have known about them. Alone, that would be
grounds to say that the accused had not sustained his burden to show
that the trial counsel's representation was -deficient."' The court of
appeals went on, however, and appeared to conflate the deficiency prong
and the prejudice prong by concluding that the lawyer exercised
reasonable professional judgment by impeaching the victims in
numerous other ways.'
That conclusion, of course, would serve to
undermine any argument that the failure to find and call the teachers
harmed the defense; it has nothing to do with whether a reasonable
lawyer would have found and called them.
C.

One Other Noteworthy Case Involving Ineffective Assistance
Taylor v. State'66 was a direct appeal of convictions for conspiracy to
manufacture methamphetamine and related charges.'
The court of
appeals rejected the defendant's argument that she was denied effective
assistance of counsel because her attorney's law partner represented her
co-defendant.'6 s As required by the United States Supreme Court in
Cuyler v. Sullivan,16 9 her burden was to show an actual conflict of
The court
interest that adversely affected the lawyer's performance.'
of appeals in Taylor concluded that there was no conflict because her
lawyer and his law partner did not engage in "finger pointing" at each
other and because the two lawyers pursued the same strategy-that both
defendants were innocent and that Taylor was "not . . . as involved." 71
The decision is questionable. The court's conclusion is correct only if
one lawyer could have represented both defendants without a conflict.
164. Id. at 249, 253-54, 258-59, 739 S.E.2d at 111, 113-14, 116-17.
165. Id. at 258, 739 S.E.2d at 117.
166. 320 Ga. App. 596, 740 S.E.2d 327 (2013).
167. Id. at 596, 740 S.E.2d at 331.
168. Id. at 602, 740 S.E.2d at 334.
169. 446 U.S. 335 (1980).
170. Taylor, 320 Ga. App. at 602-03, 740 S.E.2d at 334 (citing Cuyler, 446 U.S. at 348).
171. Id. at 604-05, 740 S.E.2d at 335-36. The opinion assumes that Taylor did not give
informed consent to any conflict and thus affirmance is explicable only if the court
concluded there was no conflict.
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If one could not do so, neither could do so because the conflict would be
imputed from one to the other.17 2 The "unified strategy" of not pointing fingers at each other surely cannot alone establish that there was no
conflict. The strategy itself might well be the result of the conflict,
especially where, as here, one client appears to have been more culpable
than the other.17 That difference in culpability highlights another
aspect of the conflict: An independent lawyer representing Taylor
presumably could have sought a plea bargain in exchange for testimony
against her more culpable co-defendant. Her lawyer could not do so
because of his law partner's representation of the co-defendant.
Furthermore, the decision was made at trial not to call the co-defendant,
who presumably could have testified to Taylor's minimal involvement or
even her innocence. Trial counsel made the decision not to subject that
defendant to "extensive cross-examination.' 7 4 The decision to spare
one defendant from testifying, at the apparent cost of the other, is
exactly the type of actual conflict that eventually led to a new trial in
Cuyler v. Sullivan."' The court of appeals should have granted Ms.
Taylor a new trial or at least remanded for further proceedings.
V. FORmAL ADvisoRY OPINION ON IMPUTATION OF PUBLIC DEFENDER
CONFLICTS 7

6

The Georgia Supreme Court decided one significant case involving an
opinion of the Formal Advisory Opinion Board during the survey period.
The court, per curiam, unanimously approved Formal Advisory Opinion
10-1 (FAO 10-1), which had. answered the following question in the

172. GA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.10(a) (2012) ("While lawyers are associated
in a firm, none of them shall knowingly represent a client when any one of them practicing
alone would be prohibited from doing so by [Rule 1.7 (2012)] . . . ."). Note also that the

Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct express serious reservations about one lawyer
representing co-defendants in criminal matters. Comment 7 to Rule 1.7 states in part:
"The potential for conflict of interest in representing multiple defendants in a criminal case
is so grave that ordinarily a lawyer should decline to represent more than one codefendant." GA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7 cmt. 7 (2012).
173. See GA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7 cmt. 7 ("An impermissible conflict may
exist by reason of ... the fact that there are substantially different possibilities of
settlement of the claims or liabilities in question.").
174. Taylor, 320 Ga. App. at 604, 740 S.E.2d at 336.
175. Sullivan v. Cuyler, 723 F.2d 1077, 1085-86 (3d Cir. 1983).
176. Other activities of the Formal Advisory Opinion Board are available online. James
B. Ellington, Annual Report of the FormalAdvisory Opinion Board for Operational Year
2012-2013, STATE BAR OF GEORGIA 2013 REPORT OF THE OFFICE OF GENERAL COUNSEL, at
11-20, available at http://www.gabar.orgfbarrules/ethicsandprofessionalism/upload/2012
13_OGC_AnnualReport.pdf.
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negative: "May different lawyers employed in the circuit public defender
office in the same judicial circuit represent co-defendants when a single
lawyer would have an impermissible conflict of interest in doing so?""'
In its original opinion and the substituted opinion issued soon after the
survey period ended, the court first noted that the key question was
whether a circuit public defender office is a "firm" within the meaning
of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.10(a), 78 which
imputes conflicts of interest among lawyers in a firm."' The court
answered that circuit public defender offices are firms within the
meaning of that rule.'80 The court rejected the argument that FAO 101 would create an automatic or per se rule of disqualification for circuit
public defender offices that are appointed to represent co-defendants.'
The court noted that the imputation rule only arises when there is a
conflict that prevents one attorney from representing two parties.18
If there is no conflict for that attorney, there is no conflict to impute to
others.'
Having said that, the court cautioned that a lawyer, and
therefore a circuit public defender office, could represent multiple
defendants in a criminal case only in an "unusual" case.'" The court
responded to the fiscal arguments that FAO 10-1 imposes unacceptable
costs on the state's indigent defense system by stating that the "problem
of adequately funding indigent defense cannot be solved by compromising the promise of [Gideon v. Wainwrighta..],,1s' the case that established the constitutional right to counsel in criminal cases.'87

177. In re Formal Advisory Op. 10-1, 2013 Ga. LEXIS 331 (Ga. Apr. 15, 2013),
substitute opinion at 293 Ga. 397, 744 S.E.2d 798 (2013) [hereinafter FAO 10-1 Adoption].
In the substitute opinion issued soon after the survey period ended, the court stood by the
reasoning and conclusion reached in the first opinion but took some pains to explain that
its result might not be constitutionally required but instead could be changed by
amendment of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.10(a). See FAO 10-1
Adoption, 293 Ga. at 401 n.4, 744 S.E.2d at 801 n.4.
178. GA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.10(a) (2012).
179. In re FAO 10-1 Adoption, 293 Ga. at 398, 744 S.E.2d at 799.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 400, 744 S.E.2d at 800.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
186. In re FAO 10-1 Adoption, 293 Ga. at 400, 744 S.E.2d at 800.
187. Gideon, 372 U.S. at 334-45. In a case that preceded the Supreme Court's approval
of FAO 10-1, the court of appeals rejected claims of ineffective assistance of counsel
regarding a public defender whose colleague in the same office had previously represented
two victims. Johnson v. State, 320 Ga. App. 161, 161, 739 S.E.2d 469, 471 (2013). In the
context of a claim of ineffective assistance, the defendant must show both an actual conflict
and a material adverse effect on the representation. Cuyler, 446 U.S. at 348-49. The court
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JuDIcIAL ETics

The Georgia appellate courts dealt with several noteworthy cases
involving judicial ethics during the survey period. In Heidt v. State,'m
the supreme court rejected claims that a trial judge should have recused
himself because the judge's impartiality could reasonably be questioned."' The defendant sought disqualification because the judge had
signed search warrants and orders for records related to the case and
because the judge had expressed agreement with a third party's
statement that the defendant would not get a fair trial in Effingham
The first argument failed because disqualification for bias
County.'
upon knowledge gained as part of the case itself, while
based
be
cannot
the second failed because the judge's agreement did not reveal any sort
of bias.' 9'
The court of appeals decided four relatively straightforward cases
involving judicial ethics. In Hargis v. State,'9 2 the court reversed a
criminal conviction because the trial judge did not recuse himself after
an ex parte conversation with the lawyer for a co-defendant about the
In Callaham v. State," a
defendant's propensity for violence.'
after the first trial, gave the
reversed
been
trial judge, whose ruling had
retrial."' The court of
a
after
defendant an increased sentence
presumption that the
the
overcame
appeals held that the prosecution
that some of the
demonstrating
increased sentence was vindictive by
a time after the
from
came
evidence that justified the second sentence
conceded
v.
State'
The trial judge in Braddy
first sentencing.'
that an affidavit that alleged she had ex parte conversations with the
lead investigator in the case was both timely and legally sufficient, but
she nevertheless personally denied the motion to recuse.9 8 The court
of appeals agreed as to the timeliness and sufficiency of the affidaAs required by Uniform Superior Court Rule 25.3,200 the court
vit.'

of appeals in Johnson found no evidence of either. 320 Ga. App. at 166, 739 S.E.2d at 476.
188. 292 Ga. 343, 736 S.E.2d 384 (2013).
189. Id. at 347, 736 S.E.2d at 389.
190. Id. at 348, 736 S.E.2d at 390.
191. Id.
192. 319 Ga. App. 432, 735 S.E.2d 91 (2012).
193. Id. at 432, 735 S.E.2d at 92.
194. 317 Ga. App. 513, 732 S.E.2d 88 (2012).
195. Id. at 513-14, 732 S.E.2d at 89.
196. Id. at 519, 732 S.E.2d at 93.
197. 316 Ga. App. 292, 729 S.E.2d 461 (2012).
198. Id. at 292, 729 S.E.2d at 463.
199. Id. at 295, 729 S.E.2d at 464-65.
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vacated and remanded the case so that a different judge could rule on
the motion.2 0'
In Lacy v. Lacy,"' the court of appeals dealt with a series of recusal
issues arising from a custody dispute.20 s One involved a claim that the
trial judge should have recused himself because he had met with the
father of one of the parties before the case. The alleged meeting came
to light because the mother could not refrain from posting on the father's
Facebook page that "[the judge] and my dad ha[d] a meeting the week
before our case and guess what[,I you lost your kids."204 The court of
appeals rejected the argument that this evidence required disqualification, because there was no evidence that the judge gained any relevant
knowledge in that meeting.205 The father also complained that a
different judge who held a hearing in the case should have recused
himself because the judge's son was married to the mother's aunt.o
The court of appeals noted that, under Georgia law, the judge's son's
relationship by marriage to a party in the case did not mean that the
judge was related to the mother, and therefore no recusal was necessary.207
In a troublesome case, the court of appeals appears to have held that
there is no need to inquire into a judge's bias at sentencing as long as
the sentences are within statutory limits. 2 0 8 During the sentencing
hearing, but before imposing the sentence for rape, aggravated sodomy,

200. GA. UNIF. SUPER. CT. R. 25.3 (2013). The rule states in its entirety:
When a judge is presented with a motion to recuse, or disqualify, accompanied by
an affidavit, the judge shall temporarily cease to act upon the merits of the matter
and shall immediately determine the timeliness of the motion and the legal
sufficiency of the affidavit, and make a determination, assuming any of the facts
alleged in the affidavit to be true, whether recusal would be warranted. If it is
found that the motion is timely, the affidavit sufficient[,J and that recusal would
be authorized if some or all of the facts set forth in the affidavit are true, another
judge shall be assigned to hear the motion to recuse. The allegations of the
motion shall stand denied automatically. The trial judge shall not otherwise
oppose the motion.
Id.
201. Braddy, 316 Ga. App. at 295, 729 S.E.2d at 464-65.
202. 320 Ga. App. 739, 740 S.E.2d 695 (2013).
203. Id. at 739-40, 740 S.E.2d at 698-99.
204. Id. at 744, 740 S.E.2d at 701 (second alteration in original).
205. Id.
206. Id. at 748, 740 S.E.2d at 704.
207. Id. The court of appeals also dealt with a more routine judicial disqualification
issue, the failure of the husband to seek disqualification of all of the judges of the
Ocmulgee Circuit in a timely fashion or with the required affidavit. Id. at 749-50, 740
S.E.2d at 705.
208. See Ellicott v. State, 320 Ga. App. 729, 737, 740 S.E.2d 716, 723-24 (2013).
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aggravated assault, aggravated battery, and false imprisonment, the
trial judge "compared Ellicott's conviction to the 'death of a monster,' and
commented that, given his family's history, Ellicott should have
committed suicide," and "stated that he was imposing a sentence that
would ensure that Ellicott would spend his life confined to a small cell
where he would spend every day thinking about the freedom that he
once had.""
The court of appeals noted that the trial judge would not have been
permitted to take into account anything outside the record but brushed
aside any need to consider the question because "the comments did not
result in any prejudice to Ellicott, because his sentences were well
within applicable statutory limits."210 The opinion does not seem to
allow for the possibility that a judge's bias could lead to sentences that
are longer because of matters outside the record, even though they are
within the permitted statutory range. This seems to be prejudice to a
defendant, and the court could have given a more searching analysis to
this possibility.
VII.

CHANGES TO THE GEORGIA RULES OF PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT"n

The supreme court made one significant set of changes to the Georgia
Rules of Professional Conduct during the survey period.212 Rule 5.5
governs the unauthorized practice of law and multijurisdictional
practice."'
The 2012 amendment added a subsection to permit
lawyers who are licensed in foreign countries to practice in Georgia if the
lawyer's services are for the lawyer's employer (or its organizational
affiliates) and are not services requiring pro hac vice admission to a
court. 214 The foreign lawyer also must be in the United States legally
and must comply with all relevant portions of the United States'
immigration law.21s In amendments to comment 14 to Rule 5.5, the
supreme court gave additional guidance about an American lawyer's

209. Id. at 735, 740 S.E.2d at 722.
210. Id. at 735-36, 740 S.E.2d at 723 (footnote omitted).
211. The Georgia Supreme Court also made several changes to the rules governing
disciplinary procedure and fee arbitration. A summary of these changes is available online.
Order Granting Mot. to Am. R. and Reg. of the State Bar of Georgia Dec. 1, 2012, available
at http://www.gabar.org/barrules/ethicsandprofessionalism/upload/RecentBarRuleAmend
ments_1212.pdf.
212. For a red-lined version of the changes, see 17 GA. B.J. 1, Aug. 2011, at 97-101
(special issue).
213. GA. RULEs OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.5 (2012).
214. GA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.5(e).
215. GA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.5(f).
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ability to render temporary legal services in Georgia on a transactional
matter."'6 Rule 5.5(c)(4) allows such activities only if the services arise
out of or are reasonably related to the lawyer's practice in a jurisdiction
The comment provides an amended
where the lawyer is admitted.'
list of factors that the lawyer should consider in determining whether
the services meet that standard.218
VIII. MISCELLANEOUS MATTERS
Georgia appellate courts decided several cases during the survey
period related to miscellaneous aspects of legal ethics. 219 The court of
appeals decided two cases involving attorneys' liens, one a straightforward application of the statute, 2 20 and one concluding that a separate
declaratory judgment action was not the proper way to enforce an
attorney's lien.22 1
In Gunter v. State,22 2 the judge, the prosecutor, and defense counsel
all agreed that the jury should be given the option to convict the
defendant, who had been charged with aggravated assault, of the lesserincluded offense of simple assault. 223 The trial judge, however, insisted
that the defense counsel consult with the defendant, and when the
defense counsel reported that the defendant would not agree to the jury
charge on the lesser-included offense, the Superior Court of Gwinnett
County refused to give it.2" The defendant was convicted of aggravated assault, and the majority on appeal held that any complaint about the

216. GA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.5 cmt. 14.
217. GA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.5(c)(4).
218. GA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.5 cmt. 14.
219. In addition to the miscellaneous cases mentioned in the text, it is worth noting
that there were several reported cases during the survey period in which prosecutors made
improper closing arguments. Lopez-Jimenez v. State, 317 Ga. App. 868,871-72,733 S.E.2d
42, 45 (2012) (prosecutor misstated evidence in closing argument but defense counsel's
decision not to object did not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel); Fisher v. State,
317 Ga. App. 761, 766, 732 S.E.2d 821, 827 (2012) (golden rule argument improper but the
Superior Court of Bartow County's curative instruction was sufficient); Holsey v. State, 316
Ga. App. 801, 805, 729 S.E.2d 465, 468 (2012) (argument about future dangerousness and
argument outside the record, both harmless errors); Lewis v. State, 317 Ga. App. 218, 222,
735 S.E.2d 1, 5 (2012) (arguments outside the record were harmless error).
220. In re Estate of Estes, 317 Ga. App. 241, 242, 731 S.E.2d 73, 74-75 (2012).
221. McRae, Stegall, Peek, Harman, Smith & Manning, LLP v. Ga. Farm Bureau Mut.
Ins. Co., 316 Ga. App. 526, 530, 729 S.E.2d 649, 653 (2012).
222. 316 Ga. App. 485, 729 S.E.2d 597 (2012).
223. Id. at 487, 729 S.E.2d at 599.

224. Id.
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failure to give the charge for simple assault had been waived by the
defendant's refusal. 25
Judge McFadden dissented because, he argued, the trial court's refusal
to give the charge when counsel wanted it, but the defendant did not,
interfered with the attorney-client relationship.2 " The dissent raises
an interesting issue about the division of authority between lawyer and
client in a criminal case.227 Georgia Rule of Professional Conduct
1.2(a) reserves certain decisions for the client. 2 28 The objectives of the
representation belong to the client in all matters, and in criminal cases
the client is entitled to decide whether to waive a jury trial, what plea
to enter, and whether to testify.22" Presumably the client's objective
in a criminal case like Gunter is usually clear, to escape or minimize
punishment for the crimes charged. The issue in Gunter-whether to
give the jury the lesser-included charge-is a way of hedging the
2
defendant's bets and thus is a means to that objectives.
"
Generally,
Rule 1.2(a) states that the lawyer's responsibility as to means is to
consult with the client."' That appears to have happened in the
Gunter case. The crucial issue is: What happens if the lawyer and
client disagree about the means, as the lawyer and client did in Gunter?
The Rules of Conduct assign neither the lawyer nor the client the
right to trump the other as to means."
Comment 2 to Rule 1.2

225. Id.
226. Id. at 488-89, 729 S.E.2d at 600-01 (McFadden, J., dissenting).
227. Id. at 489, 729 S.E.2d at 600.
228. GA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2(a) (2012).
229. GA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2(a) reads in its entirety:
Subject to paragraphs (c) and (d), a lawyer shall abide by a client's decisions
concerning the scope and objectives of representation and, as required by Rule 1.4,
shall consult with the client as to the means by which they are to be pursued. A
lawyer may take such action on behalf of the client as is impliedly authorized to
carry out the representation. A lawyer shall abide by a client's decision whether
to settle a matter. In a criminal case, the lawyer shall abide by the client's
decision, after consultation with the lawyer, as to a plea to be entered, whether
to waive jury trial[,] and whether the client will testify.
GA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2(a).
230. Gunter, 316 Ga. App. at 487, 729 S.E.2d at 599.
231. GA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2(a).
232. GA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2 cmt. 2. The relevant language is in
comment 2 to Rule 1.2:
On occasion, however, a lawyer and a client may disagree about the means to be
used to accomplish the client's objectives. Clients normally defer to the special
knowledge and skill of their lawyer with respect to the means to be used to
accomplish their objectives, particularly with respect to technical, legal[,] and
tactical matters. Conversely, lawyers usually defer to the client regarding such
questions as the expense to be incurred and concern for third persons who might
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provides that a client "usually defer[s]" to the lawyer's judgment on
technical, legal, or tactical matters but also notes that the rule does not
prescribe how disagreements are to be resolved."' The comment then
notes that "[o]ther law . .. may be applicable and should be consulted by
the lawyer."234 In the absence of such direction, however, the comment
appears to leave the lawyer with the choice either to find agreement
with the client, seek to withdraw, or wait to be fired."
Judge McFadden's central point was that there is "other law" in these
particular circumstances, and that "other law" gives the lawyer the
exclusive right to decide whether the court should give the charge for a
lesser-included offense. 3 6 The "other law" consists of a series of
Georgia appellate cases, none of which deals specifically with the issue
of whether to give the charge for a lesser-included offense."' The
Georgia cases state a more general rule, one derived from the American
Bar Association Standards for the Defense Function:
Control and direction of the case. (a) Certain decisions relating to the
conduct of the case are ultimately for the accused and others are
ultimately for defense counsel. The decisions [that] are to be made by
the accused after full consultation with counsel are: (i) what plea to
enter; (ii) whether to waive jury trial; [and] (iii) whether to testify in
his [or her] own behalf. (b) The decisions on [what] witnesses to call,
whether and how to conduct cross-examinations, what jurors to accept
or strike, what trial motions should be made, and all other strategic
and tactical decisions are the exclusive province of the lawyer after

consultation with his client."
be adversely affected. Because of the varied nature of the matters about which
a lawyer and client might disagree and because the actions in question may
implicate the interests of a tribunal or other persons, this Rule does not prescribe
how such disagreements are to be resolved. Other law, however, may be
applicable and should be consulted by the lawyer. The lawyer should also consult
with the client and seek a mutually acceptable resolution of the disagreement. If
such efforts are unavailing and the lawyer has a fundamental disagreement with
the client, the lawyer may withdraw from the representation. Conversely, the
client may resolve the disagreement by discharging the lawyer.
GA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2 cmt. 2 (internal citations omitted).
233. GA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2 cmt. 2.
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.

GA. RULES OF PROF'L
GA. RULES OF PROF'L
Gunter, 316 Ga. App.
Id.
Van Alstine v. State,

CONDUCT R. 1.2 cmt. 2.
CONDUCT R. 1.2 cmt. 2.
at 489, 729 S.E.2d at 600-01 (McFadden, J., dissenting).
263 Ga. 1, 2-3, 426 S.E.2d 360, 362 (1993) (alterations in

original) (emphasis added) (holding that it was not ineffective assistance of counsel to fail
to consult about a lesser-included offense when it was clear that the client would have
rejected it) (quoting Reid v. State, 235 Ga. 378, 379, 219 S.E.2d 740, 742 (1975)). See also
McDaniel v. State, 279 Ga. 801,802,621 S.E.2d 424,426-27 (2005) (holding that there was
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If Judge McFadden is right that this general statement means that
lawyers have the exclusive power to decide whether to seek a jury charge
on a lesser-included offense, then what should have happened in Gunter
would be clear.139 After consultation with the client, the lawyer would
choose a strategy. If the trial court refused to give the charge solely
because the client would not agree to it, over the lawyer's request, then
that would be error and would, as Judge McFadden concluded, be an
interference with the attorney-client relationship. 240
In Heidt, the supreme court rejected an argument that the Superior
Court of Effingham County had erred when it disqualified one of the
lawyers for a murder defendant.241 The lawyer represented both the
defendant and the defendant's lover (the widow of one of the victims, the
defendant's brother). The woman also faced charges related to the
murders.242 The supreme court ruled that the trial court properly
disqualified the lawyer because there was a serious potential for conflict
at the time of the order, a potential that later became reality when the
woman testified against the defendant.24 3
In Amusement Sales, Inc. v. State,244 disqualification was also an
The district attorney for the Middle Judicial Circuit of
issue.
Georgia had hired two attorneys in private practice as Special Assistant
District Attorneys (SADA) to pursue forfeiture of gaming equipment and

no ineffective assistance of counsel when lawyer chose not to hire defense expert but
instead relied on cross-examination of state's expert); Austin v. Carter, 248 Ga. 775, 780,
285 S.E.2d 542, 545 (1982) (holding that there was no ineffective assistance of counsel
when trial counsel chose not to cross-examine all of state's witnesses); Reid, 235 Ga. at 38081, 219 S.E.2d at 742 (holding that counsel has power to decide what arguments to raise
on appeal); Wofford, 321 Ga. App. 249, 257, 739 S.E.2d 110, 116 (holding that there was
no ineffective assistance of counsel when counsel did not find and call two witnesses who
had opinions about the truthfulness of two victims).
239. Despite the authorities upon which the dissent relies, there are good arguments
that the decision on the lesser-included charge should not be for the lawyer alone. This
decision is more like the decision about what plea to enter than the decision about what
arguments to raise, what witnesses to call, and what questions to ask, all of which are
squarely in the lawyer's area of greater expertise. How much of a risk a client is willing
to take on a lesser-included charge calls less for that expertise and more for the client's
own sense of risk aversion or preference. Surely the client's autonomy demands at least
a role in the decision.
240. Gunter, 316 Ga. App. at 490, 729 S.E.2d at 600 (McFadden, J., dissenting).
241. Heidt, 292 Ga. at 343, 736 S.E.2d at 386-87.
242. Id. at 343, 345, 736 S.E.2d at 386, 388.
243. Id. at 347, 736 S.E.2d at 389.
244. 316 Ga. App. 727, 730 S.E.2d 430 (2012).
245. Id. at 727, 730 S.E.2d at 433.
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proceeds. 24 6 Because the SADA were to receive contingent fees in the
quasi-criminal cases, the court of appeals held that the Superior Court
of Emanuel County should have disqualified the lawyers because of a
conflict of interest.24 7 This decision was in accord with both an earlier
court of appeals decision and a recent statutory amendment.2 48
24 9
In Jefferson v. Stripling,
the court of appeals considered the
application of the Georgia Anti-Strategic Lawsuit Against Public
Participation (Anti-SLAPP) statute250 to a case in which a lawyer
sought damages for tortious interference with her business, among other
theories, from three individuals who had filed grievances with the State
Bar of Georgia. 25 1 The court concluded that the Anti-SLAPP statute
applied to the case because disciplinary proceeding[s] are "official
proceeding[s] authorized by law."25 2 The court remanded for a hearing
required under the Anti-SLAPP statute.253
Finally, it is worth noting Clarke v. State,254 if for no other reason
than as a reminder that lawyers are subject to the criminal law as well
as to rules of discipline and malpractice law. Sandra Clarke was an
attorney who handled cases through Gwinnett County's indigent defense
program. A jury convicted Clarke of nine felony counts of theft by
taking because she did not remit her fees as indigent defense counsel to
the law firm that employed her.2 55 The court of appeals affirmed the
conviction, holding that there was sufficient evidence of criminal intent
and that the fees belonged to the firm per an oral contract of employment.256
IX. CONCLUSION
As usual, the survey period was an eventful one with respect to legal
ethics in Georgia. As the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct note, "a
lawyer should engage in continuing study and education" to maintain

246.
247.
248.
Greater
249.
250.
251.
252.
253.
254.
255.
256.

Id. at 728, 730 S.E.2d at 433.
Id. at 736, 730 S.E.2d at 438.
Id. at 736 & n.4, 730 S.E.2d at 436 & n.4; see also O.C.G.A. § 16-1-12 (Supp. 2013);
Ga. Amusements, LLC v. State, 317 Ga. App. 118, 728 S.E.2d 744 (2012).
316 Ga. App. 197, 728 S.E.2d 826 (2012).
O.C.G.A. § 9-11-11.1 (2006).
316 Ga. App. at 197-99, 728 S.E.2d at 827-28.
Id. at 200, 728 S.E.2d at 829 (alteration in original).
Id. at 201, 728 S.E.2d at 829.
317 Ga. App. 471, 731 S.E.2d 100 (2012).
Id. at 472, 731 S.E.2d at 102.
Id. at 475, 731 S.E.2d at 104.
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competence,m and recent decisions with respect to legal ethics'surely
deserve such study.

257.

GA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.1 cmt. 6 (2012).
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